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a true euro-area fiscal authority that can take
up the lender-of-last- resort function and exer
cise conditionality. The executive role of the
ECB in the design of financial assistance pro-
grammes should be revisited in light of the
new EFSF.
• Third, the ECB president and euro-area leaders
will have to regain the trust of citizens in the
ECB. Eurobarometer data document a dramatic
fall-off in trust during the sovereign debt crisis.
This Policy contibution argues that trust will be
regained with more democratic accountability, by
addressing the second challenge related to the
role of the ECB in the debt crisis and by continu-
ing to credibly defend price stability. The European
Parliament is key in reshaping the role of the dif-
ferent institutions in the emerging new gover-
nance structure and in holding all actors to
account.
1 THE TRICHET PRESIDENCY
When Jean-Claude Trichet took office as the pres-
ident of the European Central Bank on 1 Novem-
ber 2003, he started on what has turned out to be
a long journey. Nobody at the time expected his
presidency to be marked by the events that we
have seen in the last eight years.
Commentators of the time were giving him credit
for his uncompromising stance in keeping infla-
tion in check. The Süddeutsche Zeitung, for exam-
ple, had the headline: “Trichet's accession - new
ECB president for a strong euro”. Newspapers
trusted that the ECB would continue to focus on
price stability and German media praised Trichet’s
emphasis on sticking to the Stability and Growth
Pact. Commentators were divided on whether he
should raise or lower rates. The Spanish newspa-
per La Razon thought that: "Trichet, known for his
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DURING THE EIGHT years of Jean Claude Trichet’s
presidency, the ECB has faced unprecedented
challenges. Under Trichet’s leadership, the ECB has
become an institution with far-reaching tasks and
responsibilities. History books will emphasise that
Trichet’s ECB fully discharged its primary mandate
of maintaining price stability. The ECB under
Trichet’s leadership has received, and deserves,
the highest praise for its handling of the financial
crisis of 2007-2009, having been very quick to
react and effectively avert a Great Depression and
financial melt-down. But Trichet’s legacy is unfin-
ished. We still have to see whether he will be the
‘man who saved the euro’ and a lot will depend on
whether his successor and the other key decision-
makers in the euro area will rise to the remaining
challenges.
In this context, this Policy Contribution focuses on
three main challenges for the incoming president
and the institution he will lead:
• First, the ECB will have to continue to focus on
price stability. At the current juncture, a rate
cut should be considered. At the same time,
the ECB needs to remain credibly committed
to its primary mandate and fend off rising
demands for higher inflation to solve the debt
crisis.
• Second, the ECB will have to rethink its role in
the sovereign debt crisis. This involves revers-
ing the policy stance on Greece and support-
ing a solution that shares the burden more
broadly, including with the financial sector.
Admitting that the Greek securities markets
programme (SMP) was a mistake will also
allow it to more forcefully justify the need for
an SMP in the current situation concerning
core euro- area countries.
At the same time, the ECB will have to continue
Trichet’s legacy in advancing the formation of
pragmatism and adherence to the principle of
price stability, is not expected to try to make fun-
damental changes in monetary policy."
How different is our view of the ECB now, and how
much has happened in these eight years. Jean-
Claude Trichet will be remembered as the most
important person in the euro area besides Angela
Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. He will be remem-
bered as the person who transformed the ECB
from a normal central bank into an institution
whose influence extends much beyond its formal
mandate.
Under Jean-Claude Trichet’s leadership, the ECB
successfully fulfilled its primary mandate of pre-
serving price stability. Average annualised infla-
tion in his eight-year term has been 2.02%. This is
about as close as one can get to 'close but below
2 percent’ in the circumstances. This is a major
achievement for him personally as well as for the
whole eurosystem.
Jean-Claude Trichet will be remembered for revo-
lutionising ECB communication with the market
and public at large. He was elected ‘European
Banker of the Year 2007’ by the journalists’ asso-
ciation ‘The Group of 20+1’ for his clarity in com-
munication that supported the credibility of the
euro. This helped markets to understand and
anticipate future ECB action. Certainly, Mr Trichet
managed to impose discipline over ECB commu-
nication.
Jean-Claude Trichet will also be remembered for
calling for strong structural reforms and strict
adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact from
the outset of his presidency. In the early years, his
analysis of problems may sometimes have under-
estimated the relevance of intra-euro-area diver-
gences and the consequences this may have for
monetary policy. But he was clearly among the
loudest and most vocal defenders of structural
reforms and fiscal rigour. At the latest as of 2007,
he and the ECB were very vocal in asking for the
divergence in unit labour costs in the euro area to
be addressed. In these warnings, he was clearly
ahead of other institutions such as the European
1. See for example the
speech by Jean-Claude
Trichet in Helsinki, at the
Bank of Finland 200th
Anniversary Conference
(5th May 2011).
2. Quote taken from
Financial Times article
‘Trichet navigates choppy
waters’, published 24
December 2007 00:58 |
Last updated: 24 December
2007 00:58
3. For a description of the
ESRB, see Wolff and Merler
(2011)
03
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONWolff CHANGING OF THE GUARD - HUGE CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR NEW ECB PRESIDENT
Commission in its outside communication, for
example in the Eurogroup. Also in the recent dis-
cussion on the governance reform of the euro
area, the ECB played a prominent role1.
The ECB under Jean-Claude Trichet’s leadership
will be remembered for addressing the financial
crisis of 2007-2009 forcefully and avoiding major
damage to the euro-area and global economy.
When the fall-out of the financial crisis appeared,
the ECB did not hesitate to do what was necessary
to safeguard the stability of the financial system.
On 9 August 2007, the Dow Jones Industrial Aver-
age fell by nearly 400 points due to credit worries.
Canadian and European stocks also fell. The Euro-
pean Central Bank, United States Federal Reserve
and Bank of Canada all injected money into their
credit markets to ease concerns. In fact, the ECB
provided liquidity to banks even before the Fed
acted. Together with the Federal Reserve, the ECB
was the key player in preventing a global great
depression. Jim O’Neill, at the time head of global
economic research at Goldman Sachs judged that:
“The speed at which the ECB responded and its
steady tone [...] have been quite impressive.”2
Only the July 2008 rate hike was a monetary
policy mistake in this period, even though it is of
comparatively minor significance. Overall, the ECB
fully rose to the exceptional challenge of the finan-
cial crisis and fulfilled its lender-of-last-resort
function to the financial system.
Under Trichet’s leadership, the ECB became an
institution with far-reaching competencies and
broad executive authority. The ECB was initially
conceived as a purely monetary policy institution.
Some people even perceived the institution as
only deciding on the interest rate. The ECB has
taken on a leading role in assuring financial sta-
bility in the euro area. In the new financial super-
visory architecture, the ECB president plays a
leading role in assuring systemic financial stabil-
ity by heading the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB)3 . In discussions in the Eurogroup and Euro
Working Group, the ECB has become the central
actor with its voice in many instances carrying
great weight even in areas that are the primary
responsibility of the European Commission, such
as the Stability and Growth Pact. Jean-Claude
Trichet and his board have plugged a huge gap in
the discussions about the future governance of
the euro area. They have developed ideas about
how to design the macroeconomic and fiscal sur-
veillance of the euro area in a different way, and
Jean-Claude Trichet has sketched a vision of a
common European finance minster.
Jean-Claude Trichet’s true legacy is about how he
has transformed the ECB as an institution in the
overall set-up of EMU. However, the jury is neces-
sarily still out on whether Jean-Claude Trichet will
be the man who saved the euro. Certainly, history
books will remember him as the man who took
extraordinary, strong, courageous and sometimes
controversial steps to save the euro in the sover-
eign debt crisis – the most controversial certainly
being the Securities Markets Programme (SMP).
But unfortunately the crisis is not over. Whether
he will go down history as the ‘man who saved the
euro’ or as ‘the central banker who went too far’4
is therefore not yet decided. It will depend on
whether Mario Draghi and euro-area policymakers
will be up to the task of solving a number of impor-
tant challenges which still hang over the euro. In
the next section, I want to focus on three of these
challenges faced by the euro area as Mario Draghi
prepares to assume the presidency of the ECB at
this crucial time.
2 CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR THE NEW ECB
PRESIDENT
2.1 Defining the rightmonetary policy stance and
keeping inflation expectations well anchored
The core mandate of the ECB is to maintain price
stability. Therefore, the new President will have to
continue to keep a clear and vigilant eye on any
risk of missing the inflation target. The ECB gov-
erning council has decided to increase the main
interest rate twice this year. The first rate hike on
13 April by 0.25 percentage points to 1.25 was
fully justified. Inflation expectations as derived
from inflation swaps had been increasing since
August 2010, and 2, 5, and 10-year expectations
had clearly exceeded the definition of price stabil-
4. Ralph Atkins, ‘Trichet’s
legacy: keeping the show on
the road’, Financial Times,
22 August, 2011.
ity by the ECB of close but below 2 percent (see
Figure 1). Also other measures of inflation expec-
tations such as the consensus forecast had been
on an increasing path.
It is more difficult, however, to follow the logic of
the second rate hike to 1.5 percent on 13 July. One
and two year inflation expectations had already
been below 2 percent before the meeting, and five-
year inflation expectations were standing at 2.01
percent before the meeting on 11 July . Only 10-
year inflation expectations were standing above
the medium-term inflation target. In addition, at
the time of the July meeting, it had already
become clear that economic data for Germany
showed a significant weakening of activity, and
activity in other major euro-area economies had
been weak for some time already.
Policymakers have, however, been caught by sur-
prise by the massive fall in stock markets in recent
weeks. This decline in asset prices further con-
tributes to a weakening in activity as it constitutes
a fall in wealth, thus dampening consumption and
investment. I would therefore advise to consider
afresh the case for a gradual reduction in the inter-
est rate.
A reduction in the main ECB rate (main refinancing
operations - fixed rate tenders) would also bring
the monetary policy stance into line with liquidity
provision of the ECB to the euro-area banking
system. Since the beginning of the crisis, liquid-
ity provision of the ECB has been too large com-
pared to the monetary policy stance (see Figure
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Figure 1: Euro Inflation Swap (2 yr, 5 yr, 10 yr)
Source: Datastream
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5.It is questionable whether
liquidity provision and the
monetary stance can be
fully separated, suggesting
that the monetary policy
stance was also more
accommodative.
6. A nice summary is given
in for example Münchau,
‘Greece’s bail-out only
delays the inevitable’, 18
April, 2010, Financial
Times.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms
/s/0/da5b9516-4b1f-11df-
a7ff-00144feab49a,s01=1.
html#axzz1WOsqAbOz
7. While the fundamental
mistakes of charging very
high interests rate without
any debt reduction was
acknowledged, the new
programme also still falls
short of what is needed.
2). De facto, there has thus been a more accom-
modative stance.5 The increase in the main ECB
rate was clearly meant to signal a normalisation
of monetary policy conditions. The simultaneous
decline in the EONIA, however, indicates that the
ECB rate decision was in disconnect with the liq-
uidity needs to the financial system.
All in all, given the weak economic activity data,
the recent global slowdown as well as the clear
downward trend in inflation expectations, a clear
case can be made to carefully consider the case
for a rate reduction. At the same time, the ECB
president and the governing council will need to
keep a close eye on the medium- to long-term
inflation expectations and the rising debate about
inflation as the best way to address the euro-area
debt crisis. If market participants start to believe
that ECB independence and commitment to that
goal may be weakened, inflation expectations will
pick up very quickly, putting the economic system
under heavy stress.
The ECB will also need to step up its communica-
tion effort so that economic actors better under-
stand that a credible inflation commitment does
not imply that inflation rates will be equal in all
euro-area countries. In fact, inflation rates in
German and the core euro-area countries will have
to exceed two percent in the coming years. In turn,
inflation rates in the southern European countries
with competitiveness adjustment needs will need
to be below two percent. This logic is still not
widely understood.
2.2 Revisit the role of the ECB in the debt crisis
The new ECB president will need to carefully recon-
sider the role the ECB should play in the debt
crisis. This task has various dimensions.
A) The ECB has taken a strong stance in the ques-
tion of burden-sharing for insolvent governments.
In the case of Greece, the ECB initially argued that
all the burden of adjustment should be placed on
the Greek taxpayer. I know of only very few econ-
omists who believed that this would be a strategy
that would work.6
From the outset, Greek debt sustainability was
questioned by independent economists as well as
by the IMF. Very soon after the details of the first
Greek programme were announced (10 May
2010), most economists agreed that there was a
high probability that the programme would not
work, especially given the high interest rates
charged on the assistance loans. The IMF entered
into the programme with Greece despite consid-
erable uncertainty as regards the solvency of
Greece. The IMF considered the risks to the pro-
gramme to be high (IMF staff report, ‘Request for
Stand-By Arrangement’, 5 May, 2010). It never-
theless entered into the programme with the pur-
pose of “safeguarding financial sector stability
and reducing the risk of international systemic
spillovers.”
The policy community including the ECB contin-
ued to act as if in denial of the Greek facts for more
than one year, thereby contributing to uncertainty.
Only on 21 July, 2011 did the European Council
accept that the programme would not work and
came up with a new programme.7 This long period
‘It is difficult to justify SMPs for insolvent governments in assistance programmes such as
Greece. In the case of Italy, the SMP can be justified both for monetary policy reasons and lender-
of-last-resort functions.’
Figure 2: EONIA and Main Refinancing Operation
Rate (MRO)
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of denial of reality is remarkable. In the eyes of
many, it undermined trust in euro-area policy-
making. Moreover, the looming uncertainty about
the eventual course of action given the inevitable
also contributed to market stress.
The most convincing argument for having entered
into the Greek programme was that this would give
time for the market and for policymakers to pre-
pare for the inevitable. In particular, it was hoped
that delaying necessary restructuring would help
the banking system to regain strength. However,
euro-area policymakers did not prepare for a
restructuring. They also did not do enough to force
the banking system to recapitalise.
In preparation for the 21 July summit this year,
which aimed at solving the Greek problem, the ECB
again took a strong position. It refused to con-
tribute to a solution that would involve private
investors. It is unprecedented that a technocratic
institution could play such a role. De facto, the ECB
committed taxpayers’ money without the consent
of national parliaments. Unfortunately, the deal for
Greece is unfinished with two still unresolved
issues: the extent of involvement of the private
sector and the guarantees creditor countries will
get in exchange for further loans.
While certainly financial stability considerations
are an important argument for reducing private
sector involvement in the Greek deal, the ECB
should have provided compelling evidence to con-
vince policymakers and the national sovereigns
that the euro-area financial system would not be
able to withstand a loss in the order of magnitude
of 1% of euro area GDP.8 Another argument
advanced was that a debt restructuring in one
country would lead to the exit of that country.
However, Darvas (2011) convincingly shows that
this is a very far-fetched assumption. Finally, the
argument was made that preventing a Greek debt
restructuring would avoid any increase in spreads
in other euro-area economies. This strategy obvi-
ously did not work. Markets re-assessed sover-
eign bonds all across Europe in the face of the
lingering uncertainty created by euro-area policy-
making and in light of structural news from other
economies, including of course political instabil-
ity in Italy recently.
The incoming president should consider carefully
whether such a strong role is appropriate for a
non-elected technocratic institution and whether
it may undermine the legitimacy of the ECB and
its ability to take unpopular monetary policy deci-
sions.
B) The ECB has become a very strong player in
designing the nuts and bolts of the programmes
and the associated conditionality. This is a
remarkable increase in power and scope of what a
typical central bank does. This increase in scope of
action is certainly also the result of the interest of
a number of member states. The new ECB presi-
dent should nevertheless carefully consider
whether such a strong executive role is desirable
in the new framework. Certainly, an EFSF/ESM
with enlarged powers and staff could take over
many of the tasks currently performed by the ECB.
The European Parliament should ask for a re-con-
sideration of the respective roles of the Commis-
sion, ECB and ESRB in this regard.
C) Opinions on the Security Market Programme
(SMP) of the ECB are divided across Europe. This
division of opinion by itself has become a problem
for the ECB as I will show below (section 2.3).
Any discussion of the SMP needs to take into
account the incomplete institutional set-up of the
euro area, which led the ECB into taking responsi-
bilities for which it was not originally designed. In
fact, the euro-area crisis has exposed deep defi-
ciencies in the governance of Economic and Mon-
etary Union. It took several months – after the
start of what was initially the Greek crisis – for the
euro area to put in place instruments which,
although useful, are still proving insufficient to
extinguish the fire. To date, the euro area still does
not have a full, unified lender of last resort. Irre-
spective of what one thinks of the wisdom of the
SMP itself, one has to acknowledge that only the
ECB has the technical capability to do this. If a
decision had been taken to buy Greek government
bonds, only the ECB could have done it. Obviously
8. Of course, other reasons
may explain the ECB
position on Greek debt
restructuring. The ECB itself
always argued that such a
restructuring would have
had negative consequences
for financial stability and
lead to a second ‘Lehman
Brothers’. However, if that
had been the main motive
of the ECB, it should have
provided much clearer
evidence in this regard.
Within the ESRB as well it
failed to advance the
discussion sufficiently in
this direction.
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the ECB could have used its independence and
refused such purchases. It would then, however,
have known that no other institution could have
played this role.
Buying government bonds of the insolvent Greek
government constitutes a significant risk to the
balance-sheet of the ECB and may have under-
mined the independence of the ECB. For a govern-
ment that is fully taken off the market by a
financial assistance programme, the buying of its
bonds on the secondary market, as done by the
ECB, has no fiscal implications.9 The ECB always
argued that it entered into the SMP to improve
monetary policy transmission. However, there is
only very limited evidence of why the SMP would
have mattered for monetary policy transmission
in Greece. Certainly Greek banks continued to get
access to ECB liquidity at generous terms. The pro-
gramme also foresaw a significant amount of cap-
ital to recapitalise the Greek banking system if
needed. Greek banks therefore had the liquidity
needed to conduct their normal banking business.
It is also clear that fiddling around with the price of
Greek bonds in the secondary market helped little
to change market assessments of other euro-area
bonds. It is therefore very difficult to understand
the rationale for buying Greek bonds. The Greek
SMP came at a price: it contributed to the ECB’s
balance-sheet exposure to Greece. This may have
undermined the independence of the ECB and
may explain the tragic role played by the ECB in
the subsequent discussions on Greece. I therefore
argue that the Greek SMP was a mistake not only
with the benefit of hindsight.
On the other hand, the ECB in the current incom-
plete euro-area architecture has to perform a
lender-of-last-resort role in order to avoid liquidity
crises becoming self-fulfilling solvency crises.
This is needed to avoid bad equilibria from hap-
pening. The current European set-up does not
have any institution besides the ECB that is in a
position to provide the liquidity needed to credi-
bly deter betting against solvent governments .10
The Italian situation is different from the Greek
one, both in terms of debt sustainability and in
terms of the banking sector. A malfunctioning sov-
ereign bond market in Italy seriously undermines
the proper functioning of monetary policy as it
affects the banking system of the third largest
economy of the euro area. This should remain the
main argument of the ECB for its SMP programme
in Italy. The ECB should make an effort to explain
why and how the SMP helped to stabilise the mon-
etary transmission mechanism in Italy. In addi-
tion, an Italian SMP comes with lower risks. Most
economists agree that Italy is solvent at the inter-
est rate it had to pay before the recent increase in
spreads. Assuming that this is a correct assess-
ment, a credible commitment by the ECB to buy
Italian bonds to an unlimited extent if needed
would fend off all market speculation against Italy
immediately (again: assuming solvency).
After basically having suspended the SMP pro-
gramme since January 2011, the ECB decided to
enter into a new SMP programme in August 2011.
It bought €22 bn of government bonds followed by
€14 bn, then another €5.3 bn in August. While the
ECB does not disclose which government bonds it
buys, there is a general agreement that most of
these purchases went to Italy and to some extent
to Spain. As in the previous SMP, the effect of the
SMP on aggregate liquidity was offset by fixed-
term deposit operations.
Was it necessary to take up the SMP for Italy at
this particular point in time? There was certainly
considerable concern that the widening spreads
would seriously undermine the stability of the Ital-
ian banking sector. The ECB therefore had to act.
Fiscally, there was no immediate urgency. Italian
debt is long-term debt and refinancing needs for
Italy up to the end of the year amount to €170bn.
The fiscal implications of a spread of four percent-
age points are therefore very limited, not exceed-
ing €8 billion a year.11 This is money that certainly
matters but that does not fundamentally change
the solvency equation for Italy. On the other hand,
in the current recessionary environment, an addi-
tional fiscal tightening of the order of €8 bn cer-
tainly would have had negative consequences on
growth.12 The ECB therefore decided to go ahead
with the SMP and help Italy to fend off market
9. Suppose that
policymakers actually
believed in Greek solvency.
In that case, it would have
been inconsistent to ask for
high interest rates on
official loans while at the
same time trying to lower
rates on the secondary
market via SMP. Such a
policy is not suited to
fending off liquidity crises.
Irrespective of who was the
main driver of the penalty
interest rate on assistance
loans, once this was known,
no SMP programme could
have changed the
insolvency equation as all
maturing debt was rolled
over under the conditions of
the programme anyway.
10. For a recent discussion
see De Grauwe (2011)
11. Assuming €30 bn
deficit financing needs.
12. The fiscal advantage of
ECB action is difficult to
quantify. Assuming that
spreads would have
widened in the absence of
ECB action, the potential
gains could be in the order
of magnitude of 2%-
4%*200bn=4-8bn.
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doubt early on. In exchange, there was apparently
a secret letter by the current and incoming ECB
presidents to the Italian prime minister. This letter
reportedly set out the conditions attached to the
Italian SMP, and Italy moved quickly to pass a
budget law and enact structural reforms.
On balance, the SMP deal with Italy therefore is
more sensible than in the case of Greece. There is
a clearer case as regards monetary policy trans-
mission. Moreover, the SMP was connected with
ECB-imposed conditionality and in exchange pro-
vided budget relief. However, without a true euro
area fiscal backstop, the ECB can only temporar-
ily pursue such a policy as it would accumulate too
much risk and lose its independence. Moreover,
ECB- imposed conditionality in exchange for SMP
can only be a temporary solution. The European
Parliament should demand democratic accounta-
bility in any future deal of this kind.
In the long run, the new ECB president will have to
find a way of solving the tension between being
the only institution with the necessary fir-power
to fend of liquidity crises while on the other hand
avoiding to be forced to buy large amounts of
bonds over a long period. Continuing with the SMP
at the current rate for a prolonged period of time
will not be possible. It would imply a massive
increase of the holding of Italian debt, thereby
leading to a substantial increase of risk for the bal-
ance-sheet of the ECB. In addition, sterilising such
large amounts of liquidity from the banking
system will not be possible without frictions and
possible distortions in the distribution of liquidity
in the banking system. Ultimately, the new ECB
president will therefore have to push European
governments to finally form a fiscal mechanism
that can serve as the European lender of last
resort. This mechanism would need to have far-
reaching executive authority as regards national
fiscal policy. The outgoing president has rightly
identified the need to develop a vision of a Euro-
pean finance minister.13
The agreement of the European Council of 21 July
can be seen as a first step in this direction. An
enlarged EFSF will take over some of the functions
currently performed by the ECB, including the
buying of sovereign bonds on the secondary
market. It is also planned that the EFSF will get
some additional staff, potentially in order to have
a greater executive role. But the agreement of 21
July is unfinished business.
2.3 Regain the trust of the general public in the
ECB and the euro
One of the most serious challenges the ECB and
European policymakers in general face is the
rising mistrust in the euro project itself by both
financial markets and the wider public. The mis-
trust of financial markets is in the daily news:
interest rate spreads between national sovereign
bonds have been considerable for some time now,
and financial markets do not believe that a solu-
tion has been found to the problems in Greece in
particular. I refrain from further discussion of
financial market trust.
Instead, I want to focus on the mistrust of the gen-
eral public in the euro and the ECB. The latest avail-
able data from the Eurobarometer14 shown in
Figures 1 and 2 in the annex document that sup-
port for the euro has been falling in the last couple
of years in all countries except Greece. The most
dramatic fall can be seen in France, Germany and
Portugal. The drop is significant, and beyond the
typical volatility observed in the survey (as can
be seen from the last column giving the standard
deviation in the table in annex).
This decline in the support for the euro has been
matched by an even more worrying decline in the
trust in the institution responsible for the euro, the
ECB. In only 5 of the 12 euro member states does
a majority of the population trust the ECB. The
most dramatic decline can be seen in Germany,
the Netherlands, but also Greece, Belgium, Ireland
and Spain. In France, trust in the ECB is the lowest
of all the 12 euro-area countries in the sample:
less than one third of the French population trusts
the ECB, and more people distrust rather than
trust the ECB.15
The time profile of net trust in the ECB is interest-
13. See Trichet’s speech
‘Building Europe, Building
Institutions’ in receiving the
Karlspreis (Aachen, 2 June
2011)
14. The standard
Eurobarometer is a survey
consisting of approximately
1000 face-to-face
interviews per EU country. It
is published twice a year
(Spring and Autumn) and
data can also be retrieved
from the Interactive Search
System online.
15. French absolute figures
may be distorted by the fact
that the ECB is called a bank
and public opinion about
banks is not very
favourable. In France there
is of course also a long
tradition of scepticism
towards an independent
central bank with an
exclusive focus on fighting
inflation There was already
back in 2007 a lot of public
criticism towards the ECB
on both sides of the political
spectrum that the strong
euro was allegedly
destroying French industry
and that there was no need
to keep pushing rates up.
However, it is theerefore all
the more surprising to see
that support for the ECB
dropped when it expanded
its mandate beyond
inflation fighting.
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ing. In particular in Germany, but also in France,
the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and even Bel-
gium, a particularly strong drop is visible in the
June 2010 data. This is of course the month right
after the first Greek programme. These data sug-
gest that the Greek programme was not popular.
These figures are worrying as ultimately, the euro
can only be successful if the population supports
the euro and the ECB. Unfortunately, the Euro-
barometer has no further question giving an indi-
cation of why trust has gone down and so it is up
to me to hypothesise on this. I would argue that
the ECB and the euro have lost support in the dif-
ferent countries for different reasons:
In Germany, Austria, Finland and the Netherlands,
‘Falling trust in the ECB and the euro by citizens undermines the foundations of the common
currency.’
Figure 3: Trust in the ECB: Belgium, Germany,
France
Figure 4: Trust in the ECB: Netherlands, Austria,
Finland
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Figure 5: Trust in the ECB : Greece, Portugal,
Ireland
Figure 6: Trust in the ECB: Spain, Italy
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there is growing fear that the ECB is misusing its
independence to carry out fiscal policy operations
in favour of southern Europe. The particularly
steep decline in Germany in June 2010 may be
explained by the effect of the SMP programme and
the subsequent public debate, with Axel Weber
heavily opposing such a programme. A further
indication that the controversial SMP discussion
played a role in Germany is the fact that there was
a much steeper drop in net trust in the ECB than
in support for the euro. It appears that German
public opinion felt particularly betrayed by the
ECB. Also now, there is a growing group of politi-
cians that claim that the ECB is exceeding its man-
date and monetising government debt. These
politicians fear that this ECB policy will become
inflationary.16
Such public debate by high-ranking state repre-
sentatives, national central bankers and com-
mentators at large is harmful to the ECB. In order to
avoid this criticism, the new ECB president will
have to make a significant communication effort
to justify the SMP programme with monetary
policy operations. Clearly, the current statement
that the transmission of monetary policy is not
functioning properly when spreads are high is not
perceived to be sufficient. Instead, I recommend
that the ECB is pro-active in using its intellectual
fire-power to convince academics, journalists and
other stakeholders that large spreads are a seri-
ous issue for monetary policy. With such a pro-
active strategy, the ECB may be able to regain the
lead in the debate and thereby regain trust in this
group of countries.
In the three countries under financial assistance
programmes, the public view of the ECB is cer-
tainly heavily influenced by the role the ECB
played in the design and implementation of pro-
grammes. The public perception is that the IMF
has become the good ‘cop’, understanding the real
problems, while the ECB has become the ‘bad cop’.
The most obvious evidence in this regard is the
strong disconnect between support for the euro,
which has dramatically increased in Greece since
2008 and the trust in the ECB, which has fallen
dramatically in Greece since the start of the pro-
gramme. Also in Ireland, trust in the ECB has fallen
dramatically despite a continuously strong sup-
port for the euro. The ECB has played a role in pre-
venting a larger participation of the financial
sector while at the same time shifting the burden
onto local taxpayers. This strong interference in
national sovereignty has not been popular. The
ECB may have been right in its policy but again it
has not done enough to convince citizens and
informed observers of this.
In all fairness, it needs to be admitted that not
only trust in the ECB has declined considerably,
but other European institutions and national gov-
ernments are also affected. Similar declines in
trust in the European Commission and also
national governments can be observed, while
trust in the European and national parliaments
has kept up comparatively well. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to further discuss this.
3 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMENDATIONS
The European Central Bank has been transformed
into an institution with far-reaching executive
authority and competencies. This has been the
result of a combination of factors, the lack of
strong political leadership in the euro area and the
absence of alternatives being among the most
important ones. But this strong increase in execu-
tive powers has come at a price, and the role of the
ECB needs to be re-calibrated in the future.
1 I have shown that popular trust in the ECB has
fallen dramatically in programme countries.
The ECB should reconsider whether its strong
involvement in the design of financial assis-
tance programmes is desirable. It should also
consider softening its stance on sovereign-
debt restructuring and burden-sharing, thus
yielding to the primacy of taxpayers and sup-
porting those. In the case of Greece, the ECB
should become an advocate of a clear debt cut
at the expense of the financial sector, thereby
finally ending uncertainty.
2 The Securities Markets Programmes have been
very controversial in Germany and other credi-
tor countries and it is difficult to justify SMPs
16. The most prominent
example is certainly the
speech by German
President Christian Wulff in
Lindau,
http://www.bundespraeside
nt.de/SharedDocs/Reden/D
E/Christian-
Wulff/Reden/2011/08/110
824-
Wirtschaftsnobelpreistraeg
er.html;jsessionid=003377
75E370574E9F069EE120
A03B99.2_cid030. But
there are several politicians
in a number of countries
that openly criticise the
ECB.
CHANGING OF THE GUARD - HUGE CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR NEW ECB PRESIDENT Wolff
10
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
for insolvent governments in assistance pro-
grammes such as Greece. This has seriously
undermined trust in the ECB. In the case of
Italy, the SMP can be justified both for mone-
tary policy reasons and lender-of-last-resort
functions. The ECB needs to make a much
greater effort to justify this policy action, in par-
ticular when the order of magnitude is reaching
the current levels of €10-20 bn per week. In
addition, the ECB president needs to continue
arguing for a viable fiscal solution to replace the
lender-of-last-resort function.3 The third is
quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve, the
Bank of England and the Bank of Japan.
3 The most important task for the ECB will be to
credibly continue to anchor inflation expecta-
tions. We will see very strong calls for higher
inflation targets to solve the debt crisis17. It will
therefore be important that market participants
as well as the population at large continue to
trust the ECB to fulfill its primary mandate.
4 I have not discussed the changes in monetary
policy strategy implied by the new emphasis
on financial stability. To what extent should the
ECB lean against the wind with monetary policy
when it sees asset market bubbles emerging?
How would its greater financial stability respon-
sibility shape its monetary policy strategy?
What should be done in case of a trade-off
between inflation and stability? What role
should the EP have in holding the ECB to
account? Pisani-Ferry and Weizsäcker (2009)
as well as Setzer, van den Noord and Wolff
(2011) offer some thoughts on this.
Overall, the ECB’s role will likely be reduced in the
future and the roles exercised will have to be
matched by an increase in democratic accountabil-
ity.
17. See for example
Eichengreen, ‘The big
Cannoli’, Eurointelligence,
17 August 2011, for a
discussion.
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Figure 1: Support for the EMU: Belgium,
Germany, France
Figure 1: Support for the EMU: Netherlands,
Austria, Finland
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Figure 2: Support for the EMU: Greece, Ireland,
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Figure 2: Support for the EMU: Italy, Spain
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